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1 
Anti-Doping Inconsistencies  
Snare American Star 
PETER CHARLISH* & ROB HEYWOOD** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the inconsistencies associated with doping control and explains the 
inequity which results from such inconsistent application particularly where the violation is 
caused by a recreational substance.  This is achieved through an analysis of the WADA 
code anti-doping rules and the interrelationship with the principle of strict liability and an 
examination of the recent case IRB v. Keyter.1  The application of these rules creates 
impossible behavioural burden on athletes; ultimately this may result in a further challenge 
to the legal status of such rules under EU competition law. 
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With ever-increasing regularity, the World Anti-Doping Agency Code (WADA Code), 
which sought to provide clarity to the question of doping control in sport, is being 
challenged.2 And, disturbingly for firm adherents of the principle of strict liability and the 
WADA Code, participants who are found guilty of doping violations—as defined by the 
WADA Code—are not subjected to the mandatory two-year ban from competition.3  The 
mechanisms in place for allowing a reduction in the mandatory sentence are found in the 
“exceptional circumstances defence”. A sanction can be reduced with a finding that a 
sportsperson has no direct or significant fault or negligence in relation to how the banned 
substance came to be in his body.  While theoretically, the exceptional circumstances 
defence is a desirable exception, if applied too frequently it has the potential to undermine 
the notion of strict liability, the linchpin of the war against drugs in sport.  Recent case law 
suggests there are some internal inconsistencies as to how this defence is being applied by 
sports governing bodies and thereafter the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).  On the one 
hand, it appears to be invoked too readily, allowing for the reduction in bans which 
otherwise would not be possible; on the other, it has sometimes been interpreted extremely 
restrictively creating unrealistic expectations on sports competitors.  This Article explores a 
number of issues with respect to drugs in sport.  This Article begins by examining the 
principle of strict liability and how this is applied in practice.  The Authors provide an 
analysis of the legal relationship between sports participants and sports governing bodies, 
progressing to an exploration of the legal status of the anti-doping rules.  The Article then 
focuses on the inconsistencies apparent in relation to recreational drugs in sport and 
highlights some of the definitional problems and evidentiary difficulties.  The Article 
concludes by examining the exceptional circumstances defence via an in-depth case study 
analysis of one American rugby union star who seems to be the victim of an over zealous 
decision from the CAS. 
 
2. The football authorities in particularly seem unable or unwilling to fully comply with the WADA Code in 
matters of doping control. This failure to comply has been formally acknowledged by the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport in the advisory opinion,  issued by the Court.  CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA. 
3. The most recent example of this treatment of athletes through the WADA Code occurred with Pakistani 
cricketers Mohammad Asif and Shoaib Aktar who both recently tested positive for the banned anabolic steroid 
nandrolone with a level of 13.07ng/ml and 14.06 ng/ml respectively compared to the legal limit of 2ng/ml. On 
December 5, 2006, they were cleared by the Pakistan Cricket Boarb (PCB) Anti-Doping Appeals Committee 
seemingly due to the more lenient approach taken by the PCB anti-doping code compared to the International 
Cricket Council approach. The decision is clearly at odds with the WADA Code and it was announced that 
WADA will appeal the decision to the CAS.  Akhtar & Asif, Pakistan Cricket Board Anti-Doping Appeals 
Committee (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.pcboard.com.pk/Pakistan/Publications/Anti-
doping/ADAC_Decision.pdf.  Indeed, WADA did appeal the decision.  Doping-WADA appeals against decision 
to clear Pakistan bowlers, Feb. 6, 2007, available at 
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/articlenews.aspx?type=cricketNews&storyid=2007-02-
06T205652Z_01_L06713508_RTRIDST_0_DOPING-PAKISTAN.XML&src=rss. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLE OF STRICT LIABILITY 
The principle of strict liability is a primary pillar in the fight against doping violations 
in sport, as it serves to remove the inherent uncertainty resutling from questions of guilt.  
The code defines the principle in the following way:  “Under the strict liability principle, an 
anti-doping rule violation occurs when a Prohibited Substance is found in an athlete’s bodily 
specimen.  The violation occurs whether or not the athlete intentionally or unintentionally 
used a Prohibited Substance or was negligent or otherwise at fault.”4 
The WADA Code details a doping violation under Article 2 in several different ways.5  
Violations covered by Articles 2.1 to 2.4 provide the focus for discussion in this Article.  
These  are: 
2.1 The presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an 
athlete’s bodily specimen. 
2.2 Use or attempted use of a prohibited substance or a prohibited method. 
2.3 Refusing, or failing without compelling justification, to submit to sample 
collection after notification as authorised in applicable anti-doping rules or 
otherwise evading sample collection. 
2.4 Violation of applicable requirements regarding athlete availability for out-of-
competition testing including failure to provide whereabouts information and 
missed tests which are declared based on reasonable rules.6 
If an athlete is found to be in violation of one or more of these articles, then the 
consequences, at least theoretically, are severe. Sanctions against individuals are covered 
under Article 10 of the WADA Code with Article 10.2 dealing specifically with bans and 
periods of ineligibility from competition for athletes following a positive drug test.  The 
appropriate article states: 
Except for the specified substances identified in article 10.3, the period of 
ineligibility imposed for a violation of articles 2.1 (Presence of prohibited 
substances or its metabolites or markers), 2.2 (Use or attempted use of prohibited 
substance or prohibited method) and 2.6 (Possession of prohibited substances 
and methods), shall be: 
first violation: Two (2) years’ ineligibility 
second violation: Lifetime ineligibility.7 
 
4. World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code, art. 2.1.1 Comment, 2003. 
5. Id. art. 2.2–2.8 (dealing with specific offenses). 
6. Id. art. 2.1–2.4. 
7. Id. art. 10.2. 
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Punishment for a violation of Articles 2.3 or 2.58 carries the same burden, and 
violation of Article 2.4 is punishable with a minimum period of ineligibility of three months 
and a maximum of two years.9 Where the athlete can prove that the doping violation was not 
intended to enhance performance, the appropriate ineligibility period shall be amended to 
the following: 
First violation: At a minimum a warning and reprimand and no period of 
ineligibility from future events, and at a maximum, one (1) year’s ineligibility. 
Second violation: Two (2) years’ ineligibility. 
Third violation: Lifetime ineligibility.10 
The athlete found guilty of a doping violation under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 may, in 
exceptional circumstances, have their period of ineligibility eliminated.11  In order for 
Article 10.5 to apply, where the offence is covered by Article 2.1, the athlete will also have 
to establish how the prohibited substance entered his body.12  Where an athlete has 
committed an offence under Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, or 2.8,13 Article 10.5.2 explains further 
that the period of ineligibility may be reduced if the athlete can demonstrate no significant 
fault or negligence in the doping violation. Again, if the offence is committed under Article 
2.1, the athlete must also establish how the prohibited substance entered his body.14 
Comments within the WADA Code, included as guidance on the issue of exceptional 
circumstances, state:  “These articles apply only to the imposition of sanctions, they are not 
applicable to the determination of whether an anti-doping rule violation has occurred. 
Article 10.5 is meant to have an impact only in cases where the circumstances are truly 
exceptional and not in the vast majority of cases.”15 
Based on these comments, it seems that in the vast majority of cases involving a 
positive test, the athlete will be subject to a two-year ban for the first offence and a life ban 
for the second offence. 
III. THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 
It has well-established that an athlete’s relationship with his governing body, who is 
ultimately responsible for its doping regime, is a contractual one; further, doping regulation 
derives from this relationship.16 There have been many legal challenges to the specific 
principles supporting the enforcement of doping control (as distinguished from challenges to 
the implementation of bans, or the enforcement of particular punishments, which have 
 
8. Id. art. 2.5 (“Tampering, or Attempting to tamper, with any part of Doping Control”). 
9. Id. arts. 10.4.1, 10.4.3. 
10. World Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 4, art. 10.3. 
11. Id. art. 10.5. 
12. Id. art. 10.5.1. 
13. Id. art. 2.8 (“Administration or Attempted administration of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited 
Method to any Athlete, or assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity 
involving an anti-doping rule violation or any Attempted violation.”). 
14. Id. art. 10.5.2. 
15. Id. art. 10.5.2 Comment (emphasis added). 
16. See Wilander v. Tobin, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 293 (A.C. 1996). 
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become commonplace—particularly in the CAS).  As far back as 1988, Sandra Gasser17 
challenged the legality of a ban levied against her, attacking the principle of strict liability as 
an unreasonable restraint of trade.  She claimed that her ingestion of the banned substance 
was innocent; however, as a result of the rule of strict liability, which presumed her guilt, 
she was treated in the same manner as an athlete who was guilty of knowingly ingesting a 
banned performance-enhancing substance.  This, she suggested, amounted to an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.  In finding against Gasser, Scott J. cited with approval 
evidence from the then-International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF) General 
Secretary John Holt, who stated: 
The use of drugs is widely regarded as a disease in sport. Competitors who use 
drugs to enhance their performance are simply cheating. Any sport which is 
infiltrated by drugs and in respect of which it becomes common knowledge that 
its participants use drugs is likely to suffer substantially in its public image and 
reputation.18 
Scott J., in explaining the crucial issue to address, explained: 
The critical question, in my judgment, is whether or not the IAAF Rules 53(iv) 
and 144 are reasonable. They are the Rules by which the IAAF seek to 
discourage and prevent the practice of doping as an aid to performance. I need 
not emphasise the importance to world athletics, both in the public interest and in 
the interest of the athletes themselves, that the practice of doping should be 
firmly dealt with.19 (Emphasis added) 
We can see therefore that the imposition of strict liability as a means to doping control 
in sport, in terms of performance-enhancing substances, will not be viewed as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.  The policy is clearly aimed at maintaining fair balance in 
competition.  Scott J., in further explaining the position with regards to performance-
enhancing substances, continued: 
The pressure for success in international athletics, as well as domestic athletics, 
and the national pride and prestige that have become part of international 
athletics have to be borne in mind. . . . The lengths to which some people will go 
in order to achieve the appearance of success for their nation’s athletes in 
athletics competitions is in point.20 
However, nowhere in this decision against Gasser is there any evidence presented 
which might draw the inference that such principles should also apply to recreational 
substances. Little or no justification is cited for restricting recreational drugs in this manner, 
 
17. See Gasser v. Stinson, (Q.B.D. June 15, 1988) (LEXIS, England and Wales Reported and Unreported 
Cases) (Gasser, a Swiss middle distance athlete, tested positive for a metabolite of methyl-testosterone after 
winning a bronze medal in the World Athletics Championships 1987. She maintained she had not knowingly 
ingested the banned substance and pointed out that she had tested negative after a meeting just 14 days 
previously). 
18. Gassser, (Q.B.D. June 15, 1988). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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and yet, even today, there is little difference in the treatment of performance-enhancing and 
non-performance-enhancing drugs in the WADA Code.21 
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF ANTI-DOPING RULES 
Recently, the European Court of First Instance,22 and on appeal the European Court of 
Justice,23 was asked to rule on the anti-doping rules of the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC), their implementation by the Federation Internationale de Natation,24 and whether or 
not they were compatible with European Union (EU) competition laws.  In the case, David 
Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen, two long-distance swimmers, both tested positive for the 
banned anabolic steroid nandrolone following a World Cup event in Brazil.25  Although they 
were initially banned for four years, both men on appeal before CAS obtained two year 
reductions.  But the key finding from the case was that EU competition laws were not 
violated by anti-doping procedures. The court made clear their view that the anti-doping 
rules had a legitimate purpose and therefore did not fall outside competition rules.  The 
court stated: 
Therefore, even if the anti-doping rules at issue are to be regarded as a decision 
of an association of undertakings limiting the appellants’ freedom of action, they 
do not, for all that, necessarily constitute a restriction of competition 
incompatible with the common market, within the meaning of Article 81 EC, 
since they are justified by a legitimate objective. Such a limitation is inherent in 
the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is 
to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes.26 
The Advocate General continued: 
[I]t does not appear that the restrictions which that threshold imposes on 
professional sportsmen go beyond what is necessary in order to ensure that 
sporting events take place and function properly. 
Since the appellants have, moreover, not pleaded that the penalties which were 
applicable and were imposed in the present case are excessive, it has not been 
established that the anti-doping rules at issue are disproportionate.27 
While the findings of the court are perhaps unsurprising, the reasons cited by the Court 
as influential in deeming the system of doping control in sport as a whole justified are more 
interesting.  The court, in discussing the motivation behind preventing doping in sport, 
explained: 
 
21. See World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 4, at art. 10.3 (making some allowance for specified 
substances that are particularly likely to be unintentionally ingested because they are common in over the counter 
medicinal products, where an athlete testing positive for such specified substances sought no competitive 
advantage). 
22. Case T-313/02, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 407 (Sept. 30, 2004). 
23. Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 373 (July 18, 2006). 
24. FINA, The International Swimming Federation. 
25. The level found for Meca-Medina was 9.7ng/ml, and for Majcen it was 3.9 ng/ml. The legal limit is 2.0 
ng/ml. 
26. Meca-Medina, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 373, para. 45. 
27. Id. paras. 54–55. 
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The general objective of the [anti-doping] rules was, as none of the parties 
disputes, to combat doping in order for competitive sport to be conducted fairly 
and that it included the need to safeguard equal chances for athletes, athletes’ 
health, the integrity and objectivity of competitive sport and ethical values in 
sport.28 
There are very clear similarities between these comments and those produced by the 
Court in Gasser v. Stinson,29 almost twenty years before.  The overarching aim of protecting 
sport from doping violations legitimizes placing certain restrictions upon sports competitors.  
However, what is of greatest interest in this case is the nature of the substance at its center—
nandrolone, a performance-enhancing substance. The court does cite athletes’ health as an 
issue for consideration in assessing the status of doping rules, but, as noted above, it cited 
with equal emphasis issues related to maintaining the competitive balance of sporting 
activities.  While eradicating performance-enhancing substances achieves all the aims cited 
above, eliminating non-performance-enhancing drugs achieves at best only the health 
objective in full and those objectives related to the ethical values of sport in part. What then 
might the outcome be if the same competition rules were challenged following a positive test 
for a non-performance-enhancing substance?  From the perspective of the stated aims of the 
system of doping control, such a ban may be disproportionate and, considering the grave 
consequences, unlawful.  Beloff concluded on the case: 
While the ECJ had no doubt that anti-doping rules pursued legitimate aims, i.e. 
the preservatives of equality of arms on the field of play, and the health of the 
sportsmen off it they held too that the means used in pursuit of those aims must 
be proportionate. . . . The swimmers did not, however, suggest that the two-year 
suspension was excessive. So their appeal failed. They established a new 
principle, but failed to bring themselves within it. They won the war, but lost the 
battle.30 
Quite obviously, as Beloff continues,31 the result of this case may raise questions about 
the status of mandatory bans, but perhaps more significantly, a further challenge may occur 
where a ban has been instituted following violation of doping policy via use of a non-
performance-enhancing substance. 
V. RECREATIONAL DRUGS: INCONSISTENCIES & RECENT CASE LAW 
This Article raises the question of the continued insistence of sporting authorities in 
maintaining current measures against recreational substances.  However, while such 
measures persist, it is desirable, if equity is to be maintained, that common penalties are 
applied across different sports.  Several recent cases demonstrate such consistency is 
lacking.  This issue was raised by Jason Keyter,32 following his positive test for cocaine and 
subsequent two year ban from his sport.  Keyter complained:  “They [the IRB] have been 
 
28. Meca-Medina, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 373 at ¶ 43.    
29. Gasser v. Stinson, (Q.B.D. June 15, 1988) (LEXIS, England and Wales Reported and Unreported Cases). 
30. M. Beloff, Editorial, [2006] ISLR 81. 
31. Id. 
32. A former United States Rugby Union international. 
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totally inflexible. . . .  A West Ham33 player [Shaun Newton], who admitted having a drug 
problem, only got a seven-month suspension,34 was able to carry on training, be paid and 
offered rehab and regular retesting. I can’t even train with Esher.”35 
A cursory glance at the figures provided by UK Sport36 provides some evidence of  the 
inconsistency across different sports.  For example, of the thirteen positive results involving 
cocaine since 2003-04, seven have related to footballers.  Four of those received bans of six 
months; one of seven months; one was ordered to reappear before the tribunal at a later date 
and one was banned indefinitely for what was his third offence.  In none of the cases were 
the players named.  In contrast, Gurbhej Nijar, a power lifter, received a two year ban; 
James Mortimore, a rugby union player, was banned for two years; an anonymous rugby 
league player also received a two-year ban; Graham Wagg, a cricketer, received a fifteen-
month ban; and an unnamed ice-hockey player was banned for eighteen months—all for 
testing positive for cocaine.  Without knowing the full facts of each case, it is difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions.  At the very least it appears there may be some cause for concern 
regarding a lack of consistency in bans and, perhaps more importantly, the practice of 
naming some who fail tests while others remain anonymous.  Mackay comments on the 
issue: 
An English professional footballer has tested positive for cocaine three times in 
18 months but will avoid a life ban. The teenager is instead to be sent for 
rehabilitation. 
In any other Olympic sport, a competitor can expect to receive a life ban after the 
second offence. This latest incident coincides with the news that another 
unnamed player has been banned for six months after testing positive for 
cocaine.37 
Interestingly, the punishment given to the unnamed teenage footballer was that which 
has been recommended by the IOC Athlete’s Commission .  In drawing attention to further 
inconsistencies in this area, MacKay continues: 
The FA’s approach to doping is best summed up by the case involving the 
goalkeeper Billy Turley who, when playing for Rushden and Diamonds, tested 
positive for the anabolic steroid nandrolone – which earned the 1992 Olympic 
100 metres champion Linford Christie a two-year ban. Turley was given a 
warning and then a six-month ban when he subsequently tested positive for 
cocaine. In any other Olympic sport he would have been banned for life and the 
 
33. An English Premiership association football club. 
34. See The ARU Panel’s Verdict, printed in SYDNEY MORN. HERALD, July 25, 2006, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/sport/the-aru-panels-verdict/2006/07/24/1153593265714.html (Australian rugby 
union star Wendall Sailor received a two year ban for the same offence). 
35. Marc Souster, IRB Ruined My Career, says Banned American, TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 2006, at 81, 
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,377-2409120,00.html (internal citations added). 
36. UK Sport, Drug-Free Sport, http://www.uksport.gov.uk/pages/drug_free_sport/ (UK Sport is the 
organization responsible for athletic drug testing throughout the United Kingdom). 
37. Duncan Mackay, Footballer Tests Positive for Cocaine Three Times, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 1, 
2005, at Sports 4, available at http://football.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,5322829-103,00.html. 
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sports minister Richard Caborn asked the FA to explain why the ban was not 
more severe.38 
The reason that the ban was not more severe may be because football had not, at that 
stage, adopted the WADA Code.  Football authorities cited concerns—previously 
dismissed—as reasons football players should not be subject to the same rules of doping 
control as other sports participants.  Magnay explained: 
FIFA does not want the drug agency to have overriding powers in doping cases 
and wants to deal with any cases in-house. It has long complained that the 
mandatory doping sanctions are too severe for football’s highly paid professional 
players and could pose an illegal constraint on their employment.39 
As has already been shown,40 this argument appears to be without foundation, certainly 
for performance-enhancing substances.  Perhaps the true issue is FIFA’s concern over 
retaining authority throughout all aspects of the sport, including doping control.  Football is 
arguably the one sport that wields as much power and influence as the Olympics.  
Consequently, what we may be witnessing in FIFA’s reluctance to fully implement the 
WADA Code41 is the genesis of a power struggle rather than concern over the legality of any 
prospective ban.  In recognition of football’s failure to observe the WADA Code, new 
policies are being established to deal with the discrepancies cited in this Article.  
Reportedly, proposals have been put before the Football Association Council42 to introduce 
a mandatory ban for players testing positive in competition for performance-enhancing or 
recreational drugs.43  While this step is progressive, and will go some way toward removing 
the inconsistencies evident between the treatment of offenders from football compared to 
other sports, it does not go far enough.  The move will only affect those testing positive 
following competition, leaving those testing positive in an out-of-competition setting 
unaffected.  As a result, some anomalies and resultant injustices will remain. 
An interesting practical point is made concerning the testing of athletes for recreational 
drugs.  Graf-Baumann writes: 
Recent years have shown a constant increase of positive tests for recreational 
drugs. While this finding reveals rather a social than a doping problem in the 
sense of the word, an important legal aspect has to be considered too: the 
consumption of marihuana presents a severe offence against the law in some 
countries especially in Africa and Asia, even if consumed abroad. Here, the 
publications for a positive result may lead to serious consequences for the 
 
38. Id. 
39. Jacquelin Magnay, Soccer Faces Red Card for Athens Drugs Code Penalty, SYDNEY MORN. HERALD, 
May 19, 2004, at 6, available at http://www.smh.com.au/olympics/articles/2004/05/18/1089694343082.html. 
40. See Gasser v. Stinson, (Q.B.D. June 15, 1988) (LEXIS, England and Wales Reported and Unreported 
Cases); Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 373 (July 18, 2006). 
41. See generally Advisory Opinion Concerning WADA Anti-Doping Sanctions, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, 
FIFA & WADA (Ct. Arb. Sport 2006). 
42. The law-making body of Association Football. 
43. David Bond, Drug Offenders Will Face Two-Year Bans, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 21, 2006, at 
Sport 7, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/main.jhtml?xml=/sport/2006/11/21/sfndru21.xml. 
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respective player including a prison sentence. Anti-doping bodies should 
therefore carefully reconsider the unconditional ban of recreational drugs.44 
Graf-Baumann was referring specifically to football on this occasion. However, the 
point is common across all sports and provides another consideration for authorities 
involved in doping control policy, specifically regarding the practice of naming violators of 
doping regimes. The spectre of criminal sanctions is well-known from such incidents as the 
Festina scandal,45 and more recently, the BALCO affair.46 Arguably, sports governing 
bodies place an intolerable burden on athletes for behaviour concerning what are essentially 
purely private matters. We expect more of them than we do of ourselves—and for no clear 
reason. 
VI. CASE STUDY: INTERNATIONAL RUGBY BOARD V KEYTER 
Against this background, this Article turns now to examine the recent case of 
International Rugby Board v. Keyter,47 adjudicated by the CAS in September 2006.  The 
case raises a number of interesting questions in relation to the liability of athletes for doping 
offences.  CAS reaffirmed its hard-line approach to drugs in sport, demonstrating a 
reluctance to depart from the traditional test of strict liability to determine the guilt of a 
competitor, despite the fact that the accused, Jason Keyter, claimed to have ingested the 
banned substance innocently.  In itself, this reaffirmationg may not seem out of the ordinary 
for many sport lawyers, who will be quick to observe that a finding of guilt has been the 
verdict more often than not in cases involving banned substances.  Notwithstanding this, 
there are some substantive components of judgment that are somewhat controversial. 
A. The Facts 
The defendant, Keyter, an ex-American International Rugby Union player, was playing 
for Esher Rugby Football Club in the English National Division Two.  After a Rugby 
Football Union48 (RFU) Division 2 match with Moseley Rugby Football Club on October 
22, 2005, he was selected at random for an in-competition doping control urine test.  The 
sample was collected in a manner conforming with the applicable rules and regulations 
issued by both the International Rugby Board (IRB), and the National Anti-Doping 
Organisation for the United Kingdom.49  The sample was subsequently sent to the Drug 
Control Centre of Kings’ College London, a center accredited by the WADA.  Keyter’s 
 
44.  T. Graf-Buamann, Medicolegal Aspects of Doping in Football, 40 BR. J. SPORTS MED. (Suppl. I) i55, 
i57 (2006). 
45. ‘Festina Affiar’: The Timeline, BBC SPORT, Oct. 24, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/low/other_sports/988530.stm (providing a chronology of the scandal surrounding the 
doping charges leveled against the French Festina cycling team). 
46. Drug Scandal has “Tainted” Sport, BBC SPORT, August 8, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/athletics/4741353.stm (the BALCO scandal centred on a laboratory in San 
Francisco which manufactured a designer steroid specifically to aid sprinters in an attempt to break the 100 metres 
world record). 
47. Int’l Rugby Bd. v. Keyter, CAS 2006/A/1067 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2006). 
48. The Rugby Football Union is the governing body of rugby union in England and is affiliated to the 
International governing body the International Rugby Board (IRB). Mr Keyter’s club Esher are affiliated to the 
RFU. 
49. Keyter, CAS 2006/A/1067 para. 2.1. 
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urine sample tested positive for Benzoylecgonine.50  At the request of the defendant, a 
second sample confirmed the finding of the first test. 
The player was asked to attend a disciplinary hearing where he pled guilty to the 
doping offence, but claimed the prohibited substance had entered his body without his 
knowledge through a “spiked” drink.51  At first instance, the Disciplinary Panel confirmed 
the finding of a prohibited substance as unchallengeable.  However, based on evidence 
submitted in support of the player’s good character, on the balance of probabilities, he was 
given the benefit of the doubt.  The Panel accepted that the banned substance had entered 
Keyter’s body without any significant fault or negligence on his part.  He was subsequently 
banned from participation in all RFU competitions for twelve months, with the ban running 
from November 15, 2005 to November 14, 2006.  The decision of the panel was subject to 
review by the IRB52 under Regulation 21,53 which deals with doping control in the rugby 
union.  Regulation 21.20.6 states that if a player wishes for their “B” sample to be tested 
then this will be conducted at their own expense, which may be seen as a disincentive to 
challenge the “A” sample finding therefore raising the possibility of a player being found 
guilty due solely to a positive finding against a single sample.54  In accordance with IRB 
Regulation 21, the IRB Anti-Doping Advisory Committee (ADAC) remitted the case to a 
post-hearing review panel, appointed by the RFU, which on March 16, 2006 upheld the 
decision of the original disciplinary panel.  But the ADAC was not satisfied with the 
outcome, and under authority from Regulation 21.27 prompted the IRB to appeal to the 
CAS—with an eye toward extending the ban imposed on Keyter from one year to the 
mandatory two.  On October 13 2006 the CAS upheld the appeal by the IRB and enforced a 
ban of two years on Keyter to run from November 15, 2005 to November 14, 2007, 
effectively ending the veteran player’s professional career.  In reaching this decision, the 
central question addressed by the CAS was the extent to which the exceptional 
circumstances defence55 applied in cases of this kind, and correspondingly whether or not 
the original panel was justified in reducing Keyter’s ban from two years to one. 
B. The Arguments for Extending the Ban 
The IRB insisted that, pursuant to IRB Regulation 21.22.1, the player receive the 
mandatory two-year ban.  It was pointed out that the defence of exceptional circumstances,56 
under which the length of a ban may be reduced, should only apply in two situations: where 
the athlete can establish that he bears no fault or negligence for the violation, and where he 
bears no significant fault or negligence for what happened. 
 
50. A cocaine metabolite. 
51. Keyter, CAS 2006/A/1067 para. 2.6. 
52. The International Rugby Board is the governing body of rugby union worldwide. 
53. International Rugby Board [IRB], Regulations Relating to the Game, Regulation 21.20.5, 2006. 
54. Former Olympic Champion Marion Jones was the most recent athlete whose “A” sample tested positive 
but whose “B” sample was negative.  This led to her being cleared of all charges as a positive reading of both 
samples, (if tested), is necessary for a doping violation to be established.  Gene Cherry, Jones Cleared of Doping, 
‘B’ Sample Negative, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 6, 2006, available at 
http://sport.guardian.co.uk/breakingnews/feedstory/0,,-6063442,00.html. 
55. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 4, art. 10.5; Regulations Relating to the Game, supra note 53, 
Regulation 21.22.4. 
56. Regulations Relating to the Game, supra note 53, Regulation 21.22.4. 





144397-text.native.1225300850.doc 10/29/2008 10:23:05 AM 
12 TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW VOL. 8:1 
The precise nature of how this test operates is somewhat unclear:  is it just one or the 
other, or do both limbs of the test operate independently in a hierarchical fashion?  Based on 
the submissions in the case, it seems the IRB and the CAS adopt the latter view.  If the 
athlete meets the criteria in the first limb, clearly there can be no liability irrespective of the 
second.  If, however, the athlete cannot establish total lack of fault or negligence, the second 
prong is triggered offering a potential escape route and at least some relief from the 
harshness of strict liability and the evidentiary difficulties in establishing no fault or 
negligence.  There must be careful monitoring.  An overly strict construction may render the 
principle meaningless, whereas an overly lax one might allow the exception to swallow the 
rule.  The benefits of strict liability are certainty and consistency.  The justifications for such 
a hard-line approach are: first, that it is needed to clean up the image of sport; second, to 
protect its ideals such as fair play; third, to rid it of cheats; and fourth, to dispel the “win at 
all costs” ethos.  The question is:  how has the CAS interpreted the exceptional 
circumstances defence in contemporary sport?  This is a question best answered through a 
careful analysis of the Jason Keyter case. 
C. Discussion: Legal Analysis 
1. Proof of How the Substance Entered the Body 
In the case of Jason Keyter, the exceptional circumstances defence was defeated 
without any real need to analyze the presence or absence of fault or negligence, or 
significant fault or negligence.  The defence was barred on a slightly different footing and, 
in a sense, fell at the first hurdle.  The CAS stated that prior to any discussion of whether 
Keyter did not know or suspect—or could not have reasonably known or suspected with the 
exercise of utmost caution—that he had used or had been administered a prohibited 
substance, it was first necessary to establish how the toxin actually entered his body.57  Proof 
of the latter is needed before any consideration of the former, thus proof of both is needed to 
establish no fault or negligence.  In the proceedings before the RFU Review Panel, the 
respondent maintained that he was unsure how the cocaine entered his body, hypothesizing 
it had been ingested via a “spiked” drink.58  While the RFU Review Panel accepted this as 
plausible, unfortunately for Keyter, the CAS disagreed.  The player submitted no evidence 
with respect to the alleged night or of the actual drink which he argued that strangers had 
given him.  He could not even confirm that he was present at the stated nightclub on the 
evening in question.  Notwithstanding any of this, the CAS suggested that a spiked drink 
was only one possible explanation for how the cocaine found its way into the player’s body, 
and that there was a host of possible alternatives as to how this may have happened.  All 
things considered, it is perhaps unsurprising the CAS concluded that the uncorroborated 
nature of Keyter’s evidence did not discharge his burden of proof and, on the balance of 
probabilities, he could not satisfy the court as to how the drugs came to be in his sample.  
The CAS was not persuaded that the occurrence of an alleged ingestion of cocaine through a 
spiked drink was more probable than its non-occurrence.59  As such, the defence of 
exceptional circumstances was not established and thus there existed no grounds to serve as 
a basis for reducing Keyter’s mandatory two-year ban.  Despite the clear statements of 
principle in relation to this aspect of the case—upon which its outcome clearly hinged—one 
 
57. Int’l Rugby Bd., CAS 2006/A/1067, para. 6.8 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2006). 
58. Id. para. 6.9. 
59. Id. para. 6.11. 
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may be forgiven for feeling a degree of sympathy towards the player, particularly given the 
fact that the initial decision of the RFU Review Panel was based on testimony of the player’s 
excellent character.  While this was acknowledged by the CAS, the CAS nonetheless refused 
to recognize it as a mechanism to overcome strict liability or, more importantly, to satisfy 
the burden of proof.60 
The CAS would have been justified in ending its analysis of the case at this point. 
However, it went on to consider the scenario, assuming Keyter had been able to prove how 
the substance entered his body.  This discussion focused on the requirements needed to 
establish no fault or negligence as well as the residual inquiry of no significant fault or 
negligence. 
2. No Fault or Negligence 
Once an avenue of entry of a prohibited substance has been established, he could first 
be able to avail himself of the exceptional circumstances defence if he could establish that 
this happened through no direct fault or negligence on his part.  The first component of the 
exceptional circumstances test—as articulated by IRB Regulation 21.22.4—is extremely 
difficult to satisfy.  Indeed, this may be one of the reasons why a second element was 
introduced.  There will not be many situations where an athlete can claim he was totally 
blameless, or that his conduct did not involve any negligence whatsoever on his part.  The 
problem does not center on the issue of direct fault, but rather on the interpretation of 
negligence.  It can be established with relative ease whether or not any direct fault can be 
attributed to the athlete in question.  Nonetheless, if negligence is given its ordinary 
meaning, that of ‘carelessness,’ it is possible an athlete could never meet the criterion 
needed to discharge strict liability, and invoke the exceptional circumstances defence under 
the first heading.  If one looks hard enough there will always be something that could be 
described as careless behaviour on the part of the accused that could defeat the first limb of 
the test.  Where does the regulation draw the line?  The guidance given by the IRB states 
that the first category applies where the player “did not know or suspect, and could not 
reasonably have known or suspected even with the exercise of utmost caution, that he has 
used or had been administered the prohibited substance.”61  Yet this guidance is not that 
helpful, particularly in relation to the notion of “utmost caution.” What does this mean and 
what is to be expected of athletes? 
Considering the presence or absence of fault and negligence, irrespective of whether it 
is direct or significant, is a difficult question in its own right.  In the Keyter case, if  the 
question been addressed properly, it would have created more difficulty than it actually did.  
However, as this was a hypothetical issue they may not have given it as much attention as 
they should have—with the result that key issues were glossed over.  It may be fairly 
straightforward to determine direct fault, but it is not as easy to define negligence in this 
context. There are also blurred lines of distinction between the two components of the test.  
At what point does no significant fault or negligence become no fault or negligence 
whatsoever?  In Keyter, the CAS took a pragmatic approach.  It may be that it overlooked 
some very important questions which, in the very near future, may demand further 
clarification. 
 
60. Id. para. 6.12. 
61. Id. para. 6.13. 
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The CAS suggested that even if it were true that Keyter was telling the truth about the 
events in the nightclub, it was evident that the player had failed to exercise any—let alone 
the utmost—caution.62  Thus, he failed both components of the test: “no fault or negligence” 
and “no significant fault or negligence.”  This failure was based mainly on evidence that the 
player had consumed an excessive amount of alcohol including nearly half a bottle of vodka, 
at least one glass of champagne, and at least one cocktail containing a mixture of 
champagne, vodka, and Red Bull.63  As such it was fairly easy to establish that the player 
was drunk, and the CAS concluded that behaving in this manner was inconsistent with the 
exceptional circumstances defence.  It is justifiable to argue that Keyter carried at least some 
blame, since some degree of carelessness may fairly be attributed to his conduct.  This 
conduct ought to defeat the first limb of the test, but when considered carefully, is it enough 
to deny him the second limb?  Should he have been able to avail himself of the exceptional 
circumstances defence based on the argument that he was not significantly at fault or 
significantly negligent? 
3. No ‘Significant Fault or Negligence’ 
One of the inherent difficulties with the second component of the exceptional 
circumstances defence resides in its definitional ambiguity.  What amounts to no significant 
fault or negligence?  The emphasis has to be on the construction of significant. The 
guidance provided by the IRB suggests that where a player establishes that his “fault or 
negligence, when viewed in the totality of the circumstance and taking into account the 
criteria for No Fault or Negligence, was not significant in relationship to the anti-doping 
violation,” the player meets the standard.64  This is interesting when viewed in the context of 
the Keyter case.  Arguably Keyter’s carelessness, when viewed in the totality the 
circumstance, was not significant in relation to the anti-doping violation, particularly given 
the fact that the violation sprung from an allegation of a “spiked” drink, something clearly 
beyond his immediate control—and perhaps not even otherwise contemplated.  The CAS 
thought differently.  The CAS suggested, albeit hypothetically,65 that his conduct in 
attending the bar, and subsequently getting drunk, amounted to behaviour that defeated the 
defence of no significant fault or negligence.  This was justified on the ground that getting 
drunk—and possibly not realizing or remembering what was going on—was not an 
exceptional circumstance which could excuse an athlete from his fault or negligence.  The 
CAS concluded that accepting such a result would create a dangerous loophole that could be 
easily exploited.66  Therefore, it seems that the crux of the decision was based on the finding 
that the player was drunk.  While this behaviour alone is enough to defeat the first leg of the 
defence, it ought not automatically invoke an absolute barrier to the second component of 
exceptional circumstances.  This pivotal part of the inquiry should hinge on a thorough 
consideration of the surrounding circumstances of the particular case.  If these issues are 
overlooked, the application of exceptional circumstances may be so harsh as to render the 
defence meaningless, imposing an unrealistic set of expectations on athletes. 
 
62. Keyter, CAS 2006/A/1067 para. 6.14. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. para. 6.13. 
65. Although this was a tough call by the CAS, it was nonetheless a hypothetical call, and one that never had 
to actually be made—insofar as it was irrelevant to the actual outcome of the case.  This lack of significance may 
be one of the reasons why it did not receive the analysis it deserves. 
66. Keyter, CAS 2006/A/1067 para. 6.15. 
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D. Discussion: Wider Implications 
1. The Nature of the Banned Substance 
That Keyter tested positive for Benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite included on the 
WADA Code prohibited substances list, merits some comment.67  Keyter’s solicitor, quoted 
in the Times, considered the drug itself to be of some importance to his client’s case. He 
commented:  “Cocaine is generally looked on not as a supplement to enhance sporting 
performance as a steroid would be . . . .  Rehabilitation would be the right process to adopt 
for first offenders.”68 
There are two fundamental issues explored in that short statement from Keyter’s 
solicitor.  First, cocaine may not have performance-enhancing qualities and as such it should 
be treated differently from substances that may have very clear performance-enhancing 
qualities.69  Second, the treatment of Keyter by the IRB and how such treatment may have 
been different had he been a professional footballer punished by the Football Association or 
FIFA.70 
The precise impact of cocaine on performance is difficult to assess.  Shepel and Geiger 
writing for the Sports Medicine Council of Manitoba in 1998 commented: 
Is cocaine performance enhancing? For over 2000 years, members of South 
American Indian tribes have chewed coca leaves to reduce fatigue, decrease 
sensations of hunger, and prolong periods of heavy physical labor. Because 
cocaine produces euphoria, increased perception of mental and physical abilities, 
increased self-confidence, heightened alertness, in-creased energy, and increased 
risk taking behaviour, athletes may be under a false impression that cocaine 
increases athletic performance especially in sports where heightened aggression 
is integral to the game.71 
Increased aggression may be a desirable attribute in many different sports, particularly 
a physical contact-based sport such as rugby union and therefore it may be argued that 
cocaine, in that setting, may have performance-enhancing qualities.  However, this argument 
has little merit; Shepel and Geiger continue on the specific physiological effects produced 
by cocaine: 
Cocaine decreases endurance, increases glycogen depletion and elevates both 
free fatty acid and plasma lactate levels. These biochemical changes are 
detrimental to performance at prolongued, maximal levels of exertion. Studies 
 
67. Regulations Relating to the Game, supra note 53, at Regulation 21, Schedule 2, 2006 (mirroring the 
WADA prohibited substance list); World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA], The World Anti-Doping Code: The 2006 
Prohibited List International Standard, § S6, Sept, 19, 2005. 
68. Souster, supra note 35, at 81. 
69. Such opinion has recently been expressed by the United Kingdom Sports Minister, Richard Caborne.  
Sport ‘Social Drugs’ Ban Queried, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6171777.stm. 
70. Federation Internationale de Football Association—the governing body of football worldwide. 
71. P. N. Shepel & Dr. J. D. Geiger, Considerations for Cocaine Use in Sport, SPORTS MEDICINE COUNCIL 
OF MANITOBA (1998), available at 
http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:9jngULMdvIkJ:sportmed.mb.ca/web/pdfs/Consideratrionforcocaineuse.pdf+
%22because+cocaine+produces+euphoria%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=uk. 
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carried out to test whether cocaine can improve performance in endurance 
activities have at best concluded that no performance enhancement is attained by 
taking the drug. Clearly, cocaine can make a person feel like they are exerting a 
maximal effort, but research has shown that cocaine smokers have lower oxygen 
consumption (VO2), heart rates, and aerobic capacity. Thus, cocaine users may 
only perceive that they are performing well. Possibly, the most important point to 
remember is that the combined effects of exercise and cocaine are more than 
additive (i.e. synergistic) in terms of nervous system and may produce a 
dangerously high state of excitability under which fatal cardiovascular events can 
occur. 
Wadler similarly comments on the effects of cocaine on athletic performance: 
The few studies that exist suggest that little to no performance gains are incurred 
from cocaine and its amphetamine-like properties. Cocaine is notable for 
distorting the user’s perception of reality; for example, an athlete may perceive 
increased performance and decreased fatigue in the face of actual decreased 
performance in both strength and endurance activities. An increase in heat 
production combined with a decrease in heat loss associated with cocaine abuse 
impairs the body’s ability to regulate its temperature during physical activity.72 
The impact of cocaine on athletic performance must at best be neutral, and is more likely to 
be negative. 
The WADA Code does make some allowance for the ingestion of substances which 
may be viewed as non-performance-enhancing or substances commonly available in 
medicinal products.  Article 10.3 specifically refers to such substances: 
The Prohibited list may identify specified substances which are particularly 
susceptible to unintentional anti-doping rules violations because of their general 
availability in medicinal products or are less likely to be successfully abused as 
doping agents. Where an athlete can establish that the use of such a specified 
substance was not intended to enhance sport performance the period of 
ineligibility found in Article 10.2 shall be replaced.73 
However, despite evidence concerning the nature of cocaine and its metabolites, the 
substance remains on the WADA Code prohibited list, rather than the specified list.74 
The WADA Code, in Article 4.3.1.2, specifically refers to player health reasons as a 
criterion when deciding whether a substance should be placed on the banned list or not. It 
states:  “Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect, or experience that the 
Use of the substance or method represents an actual or potential health risk to the athlete.”75 
Case law has reinforced this motivation as a legitimate aim of doping control in sport, 
and it can be effected by both the eradication of non-performance-enhancing substances, as 
well as those that actually enhance performance.  The Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), 
the governing body of cycling, has explicitly adopted measures aimed at prioritizing the 
 
72. Gary Wadler, Cocaine, ESPN, Sept. 6, 2006, http://espn.go.com/special/s/drugsandsports/coca.html. 
73. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 4, art. 10.3 (first offence would be a maximum of a one-year ban, 
second offence a mandatory two-year ban and for a third offence a mandatory life ban). 
74. The World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 67. 
75. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 4, art. 4.3.1.2. 
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safety of cyclists in their doping control programme.  In the CAS hearing between former 
world champion Tyler Hamilton and the United States Anti-Doping Authority, the CAS 
commented: 
Elite riders such as the Appellant are subject to a UCI programme designed to 
ensure the health of riders and the overall safety of the sport. As part of this 
programme the UCI has adopted Sporting and Safety Regulations which involve 
the collection of blood samples from licensed riders on the morning of a race for 
analysis of certain blood parameters including hematocrit, haemoglobin and 
reticulocyte percentage. If a rider’s blood parameters are higher than the 
thresholds established by UCI, the rider is considered medically unfit and is not 
allowed to compete for a period of time. These health tests do not involve 
analysis of a B sample and the results of these health tests are therefore not 
considered positive for anti-doping purposes. Nevertheless these results are 
considered by UCI in the administration of its anti-doping program and the sport 
overall.76 
While such a concern for the health and well-being per se of the participants is 
laudable—and is a theme which will be returned to later—it is nevertheless reasonable to 
suggest refocusing doping control.  Such a refocus should be made on those who are found 
guilty of taking substances which, although prohibited (such as cocaine), are not 
performance-enhancing.  Presently, the WADA Code asserts clearly in its introduction that 
health and fairness are two of the rights it seeks to protect. It states:  “The purposes of the 
World Anti-Doping Program and the Code are: To protect the Athletes’ fundamental right to 
participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health, fairness and equality for athletes 
worldwide.”77 
Although the eradication of performance-enhancing substances achieves all three of 
the purposes cited above, the fight against non-performance-enhancing substances engages 
in just one of those fights.  The focus placed on eradicating performance-enhancing 
substances, and therefore retaining the competitive balance and integrity within sport, is 
entirely consistent with other rules within sport that have analogous aims.  These may 
include those which confront issues such as corruption,78 the rules against common 
ownership of sports teams,79 and the specific and rigidly-enforced equipment regulations 
which prevent significant variation by manufacturers and participants from a general norm.80  
 
76. Hamilton v. U.S. Anti-Doping Ass’n, CAS 2005/A/884 para. 35 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2006). 
77. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 4, art. 1 (purpose, scope, and organization of the WADA Program 
and Code). 
78. The recent match-fixing investigation in Italy which resulted in Juventus being relegated, and the 
decision to suspend champion jockey Kieron Fallon from all racing in the United Kingdom pending his criminal 
trial for race fixing, are both examples of the seriousness attached to corruption in sport.  It is established case law 
that one of the few circumstances where the CAS is empowered to retrospectively alter the result of a sports event 
is if there has been corruption or bad faith. Segura v. Int’l. Ass’n of Athletic Fed’ns, CAS OG 2000/013 para. 17 
(Ct. Arb. Sport 2000).  Eight members of the Chicago White Sox in 1919 were banned for life from baseball for 
throwing the World Series; more recently, former Cincinnati Reds star Pete Rose was banned from all baseball 
activity for life for allegedly betting on games in which he was involved. 
79. The Football Association, Rules of the FA Challenge Cup Competition 2006–07, Rule 24 (dealing with 
the issue of “dual interests and association” in the FA Cup). 
80. For example, the R & A Rules of Golf deals specifically with the size of clubs permitted.  The R & A 
Rules Limited and the United States Golf Association, Rules of Golf and the Rules of Amateur Status, Appendix II 
(Sept. 2003).  Regulations governing the size of cricket bats are regulated by the MCC Official Laws.  Marylebone 
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The division of competitors in combat sports—such as boxing and judo via weight 
category—is a further example of attempts to retain the closest possible balance between 
competitors.  Taken to extremes, the handicap system in horseracing is driven solely by a 
desire to minimize competitive differences—therefore maximize betting revenue.  The 
central selling of media rights is viewed as being crucially important in English football, 
ensuring that all Premiership clubs receive a substantial sum of money from the current deal 
(which runs through the end of the 2006-07 season worth £1.02 billion over three years).81 
Such selling helps to retain some form of competitive balance.  Looking abroad, college 
draft82 in the United States is yet another example of rules implemented to retain some 
identifiable competitive parity throughout the appropriate sports league.  While the 
fundamental aim of all governing bodies is to retain competitive integrity within their 
respective sports through a wide range of policies, assuming the moral lead over the issue of 
health protection, specifically in reference to recreational drug taking, may be less familiar 
and perhaps less justifiable. 
There appears to be little substantive reason as to why governing bodies should 
concern themselves with the personal lives of their participants.  Non-performance-
enhancing substances might be viewed as purely private matters which may require a moral 
assessment rather than a punitive sporting sanction.  It is suggested that sports organisations 
should be focused on sporting issues rather than moral regulation, which diverts precious 
resources from the fight to maintain the integrity of fair competition, which perhaps should 
remain the primary aim of such organisations.83 The IOC Athlete’s Commission has 
questioned the wisdom of pursuing substances which may be viewed as recreational drugs. 
In March 2000, the Commission commented: 
While the IOC has a strong interest in preserving the fairness of Olympic 
competition, and while it has strong grounds in sport ethics for seeking to 
eliminate doping, it is on far riskier ground if it seeks to mandate moral rules 
unrelated to sport. It is not clear why the rules for eligibility should include all 
recreational drugs used in all countries. If sports federations or the IOC wish to 
take a stand against recreational drug-use (or tobacco, or alcohol abuse, or other 
social problems), then this should be done through codes of conduct and 
education, rather than rules that govern eligibility for sport competition.84 
However, despite advocating such a commonsense approach, many athletes who test 
positive for recreational drugs are treated in the same way as those who systematically 
attempt to cheat both their opponents and the watching public by taking performance-
enhancing substances. The inconsistent approach across different sports also exacerbates the 
 
Cricket Club, The Laws of Cricket, Law 6 (2000 Code 2d ed. 2003). 
81. Dan Sabbagh, NTL Backs Out of Challenge to Sky on TV Football, TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 2005, at 
52, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9071-1877647,00.html. 
82. The team with the worst record from the previous year selects first and so on down to the number one 
team from the previous year selecting last.  Once all teams have selected once, the first round is over and the 
second round begins in the same manner.  This system of “rounds” continues until all available players have been 
selected. 
83. UK Sport reported that the year ending March 31, 2006 saw 7,968 tests conducted across fifty sports. 
There was a failure rate of 1.3% across these tests.  A substantial number of these failures were due to the presence 
of substances which may be looked upon as non-performance enhancing, in the athlete’s sample. Of the eighty-
three positive tests in 2005/6, twenty-two of those were caused by Cannabis, Marijuana, Cocaine or Hero.  UK 
Sport, Testing Programme, http://www.uksport.gov.uk/pages/testing_programme/. 
84. International Olympic Committee Athlete’s Commission, The Athlete’s Anti-Doping Passport, March 
22, 2000, cited in ADAM LEWIS & JONATHAN TAYLOR, SPORT: LAW AND PRACTICE 911 (Reed Elsevier Ltd. 2003). 
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sense of injustice for those who suffer a two year ban for consumption of these recreational 
substances. 
In terms of the first broad aim of the code, there is much to suggest it is failing to 
achieve its stated aims and, furthermore, that perhaps these aims need refocusing.  In so 
doing, moral regulation might be eschewed and the focus of the code directed toward 
matters of a purely sporting nature. The second broad aim of the code is stated: “To ensure 
harmonised, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the international and national 
level with regard to detection, deterrence and prevention of doping”.85 This aim of 
harmonisation is similarly far from being fulfilled at both national and international levels, 
and that being the case it may be suggested that it is perhaps time for a refocus of the 
rationale behind the code. 
2. An Unrealistic Expectation for Sports Participants 
The main reason for the IRB’s desire to extend Keyter’s ban was, in all probability, to 
simply make an example of him.  It asserted that a professional rugby player ought to have 
heightened awareness of situations which may lead to doping violations.86  This is all well 
and good, and is a stance that should be encouraged among all sports governing bodies; 
however, the expectations have to be realistic, fair, and reasonable.  In the long-run, it falls 
on the CAS to consistently interpret regulations.  In Keyter they did not.  Consider some of 
the questions which have been left unanswered.  What if Keyter was out in the nightclub but 
unintoxicated?  Is the fact that he placed himself in an environment where there is a mere 
opportunity for someone to spike his drink enough to defeat the no significant fault or 
negligence defence?  On the one hand, the player should guard against such threats.  
Arguably, there is some fault or negligence adduceable from the very fact he attended the 
nightclub.  On the other hand, the player still has to be able to live his life.  To say he is 
significantly at fault under these circumstances seems very harsh. 
What if Keyter had not been drunk but had nonetheless accepted a drink from strangers 
in a nightclub?  Does this mean he is automatically negligent?  The IRB pointed out that 
accepting a drink from strangers in a nightclub is dangerous.87 This may well be, but is 
accepting drinks from other people enough evidence to routinely impose strict liability on 
every occasion?  It would once again prove to be a difficult burden of responsibility to 
discharge if this were always the case.  Sports personalities are frequently offered drinks by 
people that they do not know very well.  Does this mean they should never accept a drink 
from anyone for fear of it being spiked?  Moreover, what counts as a stranger in this 
context?  Is it someone the player has never seen?  Could it include someone they have seen 
on a few occasions but do not know very well?  At the extreme, a very distant family 
member whom the player has only seen once could perhaps be added to this category, and 
very few people would refuse drinks from family members, distant or otherwise.  If they 
accepted a drink from a very distant relative who, for whatever reason, saw fit to spike it, 
would the CAS conclude that this family connection was so tenuous it was akin to stranger 
and thus that the athlete was careless in accepting a drink from someone they did not know 
 
85. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 4, art. 1 (purpose, scope, and organization of the World Anti-
Doping Program and Code). 
86. Int’l Rugby Bd. v. Keyter, CAS 2006/A/1067 para. 4.6 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2006). 
87. Id. 
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well enough?  This is one example of an awkward situation which may give rise to certain 
difficulties for those who wish to avail themselves of exceptional circumstances. 
Finally, a lot of the analysis in the Keyter case was based on the fact that the player 
was quite obviously drunk.  The evidence suggested he was heavily intoxicated but, again, is 
drunkenness alone enough to negate exceptional circumstances?  Surely there cannot be a 
blanket rule which suggests a player is significantly at fault or significantly negligent every 
time they have something to drink.  Drunkenness is subjective, difficult to define, and 
dependent upon the varying thresholds of different players.  Assume an individual has a few 
drinks—short of intoxication—should they be held responsible if they become the victim of 
a spiked drink?  For all intents and purposes, their drink may well have become 
contaminated without any direct knowledge or grounds for suspicion on their part.  To what 
extent, if indeed any, does the alcohol which has been voluntarily consumed come into play 
here?  It would seem nonsensical to impose strict liability in this situation, but given the 
hard-line approach taken by the IRB and subsequently the CAS, is this not the overarching 
intention?  It will be interesting to see if other sports governing bodies follow suit. 
For the defence to operate effectively, it becomes absolutely essential to view the 
conduct in the totality of the circumstances.  When viewing the conduct of Jason Keyter on 
the whole, there are arguments on both sides. He was perhaps irresponsible in getting so 
drunk, but—presuming he was telling the truth—his guilt ends there.  If he had accepted a 
drink in good faith, and not known or suspected anything about it, then it is perhaps going 
too far to hold him accountable solely for placing himself in an environment where his 
celebrity status had the potential to be exploited.  The judgment itself may have signalled 
both the IRB’s and the CAS’s disapproval for professional athletes ‘living it up.’  
Glamorous and extravagant lifestyles spell doom for the majority of superstars, and sports 
administrators are likely all too aware of this.  However, this should not be used as an 
excuse to overlook exceptional circumstances when it is appropriate to invoke the defence.  
Each case must be considered carefully and on the merits to ensure the courts do not 
overlook justice in the service of a hard-line approach to the war against drugs in sport. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The undoubted harshness of the principle of strict liability has long been suggested as 
being crucial in the fight against doping in sport.  For example, Lord Coe commented in 
2004:  “[W]e cannot, without binding reason and cause, move one millimetre from strict 
liability – if we do, the battle to save sport is lost.”88 
Unquestionably, the application of such a principle has led to injustice.89  However, it 
has been suggested that such harsh application is effectively the lesser of two evils and that 
the fight against doping in sport justifies such a harsh approach.  The existence of the 
defence of exceptional circumstances90 is designed to mitigate the severity of strict liability.  
The application of this defence leaves very little opportunity for athletes to establish their 
innocence, and even where they are able to do so, the result is not the reversal of the guilty 
 
88. Sebastian Coe, We Cannot Move from the Strict Liability Rule, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 25, 
2004, at Sport 5, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/main.jhtml?xml=/sport/2004/02/25/socoe25.xml. 
89. See Baxter v. Int’l Olympic Comm., CAS 2002/A/376 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2002) (Scottish skier Alain Baxter 
lost his Olympic bronze medal after he tested positive for a banned stimulant ingested via a nasal spray taken to 
remedy congestion). Similarly, Torri Edwards tested positive for an entirely innocent ingestion of a banned 
substance included in the glucose tablets she was taking and was unable to establish a defence under exceptional 
circumstances.  Edwards v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n., CAS OG 2004/03 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004). 
90. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 4, at art. 10.5. 
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verdict but merely a reduction of the tariff.  While this may promote certainty, it is some 
distance from promoting equity and fairness.  One of the principle justifications promoting 
strict liability is to ensure fair competition.  When viewed from this perspective, its 
persistence becomes more difficult to justify since currently it is applied to non-
performance-enhancing substances.  As has been seen, there remains inconsistent 
application of anti-doping provisions throughout the world of sport, and where such 
inconsistency remains, the harshness of strict liability is drawn into sharper focus 
particularly when applied to recreational substances such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.  
It is at this stage such justification for the application of the principle ends.  The Sports 
Minister of the United Kingdom has recently commented:  “We are not in the business of 
policing society.  We are in the business of rooting out cheats in sport.  That’s what 
WADA’s core function is about . . . I would also look very seriously at the list, to take off 
what I believe are some of the social drugs.”91 
It is a sentiment that needs to be implemented as WADA policy sooner rather than 
later.  The case of Jason Keyter92 illustrates not just the injustice attached to strict liability, 
but also the difficulty associated with establishing exceptional circumstances, and further the 
inconsistency demonstrated across different sports not just with regards to performance-
enhancing substances but more starkly with reference to recreational substances.  There is 
little justification for retention of the current policy concerning substances which do not 
enhance performance.  The moralistic energy spent pursuing athletes who test positive for 
such substances would be better spent combating artificial aids which really do destroy the 
concept of a level playing field.  Control of recreational substances is better dealt with via 
treatment, education programmes, and, if necessary, mechanisms of the state.  Governing 
bodies in sport need to concern themselves solely with sporting issues rather than interfering 
in issues which should remain the domain of the criminal law. 
 
91. Richard Caborne Testifying, Social Drugs in Sport Queried, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_6170000/newsid_6172500/6172543.stm?bw=bb&mp=rm (last visited 
December 13, 2006). 
92. IRB v. Keyter, CAS 2006/A/1067 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2006). 
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